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The Confines of Modern Constitutionalism 
DAVID T. BUTLERITCHIE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Constitutionalism is an ambiguous concept, or at least the term is used 
in ambiguous ways.  Virtually every political theorist of the modern pe-
riod, certainly during the last two hundred years or more, has used the con-
cept of a political constitution in some way or another.  There is very little 
agreement, however, on what the term constitutionalism actually repre-
sents.  Some mean it in a restrictive way, others in a more expansive way.  
Some use it in a proscriptive manner, while others employ it prescriptively 
(some, perhaps, even use it pejoratively).  What nearly everyone who uses 
the term shares, though, is the thought that modern societies need a consti-
tution in order to be properly constructed.1  In fact, many maintain that the 
development and implementation of a constitution is a prerequisite to a 
nation-state being recognized as legitimate.2 
In what follows, I explore the development of modern constitutional-
ism.  Such an exploration is necessary in order to show two things.  First, 
that the contemporary notions surrounding the design, use, and efficacy of 
a constitution rests on distinctly rationalist grounds.3  Second, such an ex-
amination will show that this rationalist foundation, with its attendant lib-
  
    *   Associate Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law.  B.A., J.D., LL.M., Ph.D.  This paper is 
a portion of a larger project in which I am engaged.  I would like to thank Cheyney Ryan, John Ly-
saker, Bonnie Mann, Jim O’Fallon and Steve Seiberson for their comments on the views presented 
here.  I would also like to express my gratitude to Kirsten ButleRitchie, Jackie Davis, Carey Kefauver, 
James McGrath, Reginald Oh, and Michelle Justus Talbott for their thoughtful critiques of my work.  
Finally, I would like to thank the Dean and Faculty at the Appalachian School of Law for their ongoing 
support and encouragement. 
 1. Jan-Erik Lane, Constitutions and Political Theory 42 (Manchester U. Press 1996); see Allen N. 
Sultan, Principle and Practical Foundations of a Global Constitutional Order, 3 Wash. U. Global 
Stud. L. Rev. 155, 162 (2004) (maintaining a view that this normative requirement should be viewed 
from a global perspective). 
 2. Ziyad Motala, Constitutional Options for a Democratic South Africa: A Comparative Perspec-
tive chs. 1-2 (Howard U. Press 1994); Saïd Amir Arjomand, Constitutions and the Struggle for Politi-
cal Order, 33 Eur. J. Sociology 39, 73 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 
14 Cardozo L. Rev. 907, 907 (1992). 
 3. See e.g. Thomas C. Grey, Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework, in Constitutionalism: 
Nomos XX 189–209 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., N.Y. U. Press 1979). 
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eral political apparatus, has led many founders to view constitutionalism 
(in application) as a very narrow formalist enterprise.  I will not attempt a 
fully formed history of constitutionalism and the concepts associated with 
it.  Such examinations have been undertaken before.4  I also do not develop 
the notion of ancient constitutionalism, or the Romanized variants that led 
to the development of modern constitutionalism, in any real depth.5  What I 
will do, however, is trace the development of certain threads that have had 
a tremendous influence on how constitutionalist concepts are employed 
today.  These threads form the fabric of modern constitutionalism.  This 
examination will show how the conflation and oversimplification of impor-
tant social and political ideas actually undermine the constitutionalist en-
terprise.  Ultimately, I maintain that the sort of narrow constitutionalism 
that has gained conceptual hegemony constrains social formation because 
it is beholden to concepts and interests that lie outside the incipient state 
involved in the constitutional project. 
Prominent in my analysis of how modern constitutionalism has devel-
oped are the concepts of “modernism” and “liberalism.”  A note should be 
made here about my use of these concepts.  Any discussion that hinges on 
generalized notions such as these runs the risk of being at best oversimpli-
fied, and at worst incoherent.  My targets here, then, should be more dis-
cretely defined.  By “modernism” I mean a set of philosophical presump-
tions about the formal, rational structure of ideas that relate to the world 
and our ability to access and understand these structures.6  These presump-
tions have held sway, more or less, since the Enlightenment.7  My refer-
ences to “liberalism” are perhaps more problematic in that the term is so 
often used in reference to disparate and often contradictory concepts asso-
ciated with political theory and law.8  In my discussion below, I concen-
trate on a conception of the good that embeds a form of market capitalism 
and laissez-faire economics into the political and legal structures that are 
found in society.9  This might be called “traditional liberalism.”10  This 
crypto-normative presumption in favor of capitalist economic structures 
shows up in certain forms of liberal political theory that favor the sorts of 
  
 4. Two excellent books have been written on this during the last century.  See generally Charles 
Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (rev. ed., Cornell U. Press 1947); Francis 
D. Wormuth, The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism (Harper & Bros. 1949). 
 5. McIlwain, supra n. 4; Wormuth, supra n. 4. 
 6. See e.g. Bernard Yack, The Fetishism of Modernities: Epochal Self-Consciousness in Contem-
porary Social and Political Thought (U. of Notre Dame Press 1997). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See e.g. F. A. Hayek, Liberalism, in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the 
History of Ideas 119–51 (The U. of Chi. Press 1982). 
 9. Id. at 119. 
 10. Id. at 138–39. 
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constitutional mechanisms I discuss in detail below.11  My use of these 
concepts in the present context is, in a sense, instrumental.  By showing 
how these versions of modernism and liberalism guide constitutional foun-
ders to a particular notion of the good,12 I hope to illuminate why accepting 
modern constitutionalism uncritically is problematic.13  In my view, con-
temporary societies that engage in formative or re-formative moments are 
treading on dangerous ground if they accept and employ this uncritical and 
formulaic notion of constitutionalism. 
II.  THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Constitutionalism has at least two distinct meanings.14  It means, in one 
sense, the actual forces and composition of society.  When one asks, “How 
is a society constituted?” she is using the term in this sense.  Used in this 
way, the concept is meant to capture the actual forces—cultural, economic, 
legal, political, and social—which comprise the nation in question.15  This 
is a more textured, albeit more amorphous and difficult to define conceptu-
alization of the term.16  Alternatively, when one talks about the “constitu-
tion of a society” she invariably means just the formal written document17 
in which the superficial structure of the state institutions are set forth.18  
This is a distinctly formalist notion of constitutionalism.19 
It is important to note in what sense one uses the concept of constitu-
tionalism.  Contemporary commentators often confuse and conflate the 
  
 11. Infra pts. III-VII. 
 12. Both of these concepts are, of course, incredibly complex and contestable at some level.  None-
theless, I find the present constructions defendable (on usage and reasonableness grounds) and useful 
for my present endeavor.  See Marshall Berman, All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of 
Modernity (Simon & Shuster 1982) (discussing the use of “modernism” as a philosophical concept); 
Patrick Neal, Liberalism and its Discontents (N.Y. U. Press 1997) (discussing the use of “liberalism” as 
a philosophical concept). 
 13. See also David T. ButleRitchie, Critiquing Modern Constitutionalism, 3 Appalachian J.L. 37 
(2004). 
 14. Lane, supra n. 1, at 5-11. 
 15. Lane calls this the second constitutional context.  Lane, supra n. 1, at 10-11. 
 16. I discuss this in much more detail elsewhere.  See David T. ButleRitchie, Shifting Foundations 
and Historical Contingencies: A Critique of Modern Constitutionalism (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
U. of Or. Aug. 2004) (on file with author). 
 17. A notable exception, of course, would be the English constitution.  See Edmund Burke, The 
Philosophy of Edmund Burke 176 (The U. of Mich. Press 1967); Albert V. Dicey, Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution 417 (10th ed., St. Martin’s Press 1961) (discussing the English 
constitution, not as a single document but as a series of proclamations and accords). 
 18. In Lane’s formulation, this is the first constitutional context.  See Lane, supra n. 1, at 10-11.  
 19. Frank I. Michelman, Can Constitutional Democrats be Legal Positivists? Or Why Constitution-
alism?, 2 Constellations 293, 296 (1996); see James W. Ceaser, Reconstructing Political Science, in A 
New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society  41, 43 (Stephen L. Elkin & 
Karol Edward Soltan eds., The U. of Chi. Press 1993). 
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term, attempting to capture both meanings (more or less), while not check-
ing to see whether their use maintains a sense of consistency and coher-
ence.20  It is, in fact, the ambiguous and sloppy use of the concept that 
permits the superficial application of formalist constitutional structures on 
top of the actual practices and structures of complex social groups.21  In 
effect, when the two senses of constitutionalism are conflated the impor-
tant aspects of the culture, history, and social structure of a nation are 
drowned beneath the formalist impulse.  Content is subsumed and inun-
dated by form.  
Interestingly, the two senses of the concept that I mention above corre-
spond fairly closely with the division between ancient and modern consti-
tutionalism.22  Ancient constitutionalism focused primarily on the nature of 
the social group, looking at the normative questions which impact that 
group.23  “What was the history of the Spartan people?”, for instance, or 
“Were the economic forces which led Corsica to an agrarian economy 
formative in their culture?”  These were the types of questions that ancient 
constitutionalists such as Aristotle and Cicero asked.24  These sorts of 
questions can be contrasted with the formalist and instrumental perspec-
tives of modern constitutionalists such as John Locke,25 James Madison,26 
and Hans Kelsen.27  This latter group, along with very many political and 
legal theorists who have followed them, concentrates invariably on the 
second notion of constitutionalism I mention above.   
So why have we lost this focus on the actual composition of society, 
on the normative questions (concerning what a just and proper order of 
economic and social resources would be, perhaps) that affect the actual 
workings of state power, and focused on the formalisms inherent in institu-
tional structure?  I suggest that this move is tied to the whole-scale em-
brace of modernist presumptions about rational order and the impossibility 
of substantive social and political discourse.28  In his study of the effects of 
  
 20. Lane, supra n. 1, at 5. 
 21. See ButleRitchie, supra n. 16. 
 22. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at chs. 1-2 (tracing this split a bit earlier to the division between Greek 
and Roman variants of constitutionalism; acknowledging, however, that the real division does not take 
hold until the modern period). 
 23. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at chs. 1-2. 
 24. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at chs. 2-3. 
 25. See e.g. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge U. Press 1988). 
 26. See e.g. Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers (Modern Library n.d.). 
 27. See e.g. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (Michael Hartney trans., Clarendon Press 
1991). 
 28. Jürgen Habermas has been attempting to show how such discourse is not only compatible with 
the constitutionalist enterprise (and as such supportive of liberal political theories concerning democ-
racy and economics), but is actually necessary in order to have these things.  See e.g. Jürgen Habermas, 
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (William 
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modernism on social and political theory, Stephen Toulmin has said, “the 
research program of modern philosophy . . . set aside all questions about 
argumentation—among particular people in specific situations, dealing 
with concrete cases, where varied things were at stake—in favor of proofs 
that could be set down in writing, and judged as written.”29  The rational-
ism of the Enlightenment was an attempt to harness and categorize the 
world.30  This led to advances in science and mathematics, and had a pal-
pable effect on our social world as well.31  As Toulmin put it, “[t]he com-
prehensive system of ideas about nature and humanity that formed the 
scaffolding of Modernity was thus a social and political, as well as a scien-
tific device: it was seen as conferring Divine legitimacy on the political 
order of the sovereign nation-state.”32   
Western political theory has, in the last two hundred years or so, re-
duced the social and political content of societies to a small set of proce-
dural safeguards and institutional mechanisms.33  This can be traced to the 
influence of liberal political theories that arose during the enlightenment.34  
The rationalism of the enlightenment had an enormous impact on social 
and political theory.35  The effect on political theory was perhaps as dra-
matic as on science and mathematics.36  As Stephen Toulmin has said: 
The idea that society is a formal “system” of agents or institutions 
has exerted a major influence on the modern world.  It was hinted 
at by Hugo Grotius . . . in 1625, even before Descartes published; 
but its detailed content, and underlying assumptions, only took on 
definitive shape later in the 17th century.  At this point, the Carte-
sian division of matter from mind, causes from reasons, and nature 
from humanity, was endorsed and continued by Isaac Newton, and 
  
Rehg trans., The MIT Press 1996); Jürgen Habermas, On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of 
Law and Democracy, 3 Eur. J. Phil. 12 (1995). 
 29. Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity 31 (The U. of Chi. Press 
1990). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 128. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Lane, supra n. 1, at 41; see Stephen L. Elkin, Constitutionalism: Old and New, in A New Consti-
tutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society 20, 24 (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol 
Edward Soltan eds., The U. of Chi. Press 1993). 
 34. Lane, supra n. 1, at 25-50; see Constitutionalism: The Philosophical Dimension 9-113 (Alan 
Rosenbaum ed., Greenwood Press 1988) (the essays in Part I); Karol Edward Soltan, Generic Constitu-
tionalism, in A New Constitutionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society 70 (Stephen 
L. Elkin & Karol Edward Soltan eds., The U. of Chi. Press 1993). 
 35. See e.g. Yack, supra n. 6; Toulmin, supra n. 29. 
 36. Toulmin, supra n. 29, at 107. 
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ceased to be of concern to natural philosophers alone.  From then 
on, it played a major role in social and political thought as well.37 
This, then, is the crucible of what has been called modern constitutional-
ism.38 
III.  THE CORNERSTONES OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Modern constitutionalism, as I use the term throughout the rest of this 
project, refers to a set of formal legal and political concepts that were de-
veloped in Western Europe during the enlightenment.39  These concepts, 
which serve as cornerstones of liberal political and legal theory (and 
evolved to support that theory), are the division and limitation of govern-
mental power, the recognition and protection of certain individual rights, 
the protection of private property, and the notion of representative or de-
mocratic government.40  These concepts are the backdrop against which the 
modern constitutionalist enterprise is judged.  The extent to which a system 
recognizes, legitimates, and entrenches these fundamental principles of 
social and political organization marks it as either liberal (in those systems 
which do recognize, legitimate, and entrench these concepts) or illiberal (in 
those that do not).  The history of the twentieth century has shown us how 
stark this demarcation can be, and the ghastly results that can occur when 
the division yields totalitarian results.41  Nonetheless, the trend that has 
developed during the last two centuries or so seems to be that these liberal 
values can only truly be protected by the development and institution of a 
certain sort of constitutionalist model.42   
This does not explain, however, why contemporary political and legal 
theorists assume that a formal constitutional document will suffice.  In 
other words, even if we accept the fact that the values that are inherent in 
liberalism are of enduring and universal value, and are therefore worthy of 
protection, why must we accept that a formalist constitution is the best (or, 
indeed, the only) way to accomplish these goals?  Further, even if we ac-
cept the argument that a constitutional document along modernist lines is 
necessary (or just even useful), it by no means follows that it is sufficient 
  
 37. Id. 
 38. Lane, supra n. 1, at 25-50. 
 39. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at chs. 3-4. 
 40. Infra pts. III-VII. 
 41. See Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933 – 1944 
(Harper & Row 1942) (discussing totalitarianism). 
 42. Gordon J. Schochet, Introduction: Constitutionalism, Liberalism, and the Study of Politics, in 
Constitutionalism: Nomos XX 1-15 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., N.Y. U. Press 1979). 
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to accomplish the goals of protecting liberal values.43  In fact, this is pre-
cisely the problem.  Contemporary theorists assume (either unconsciously 
or with some willful blindness) that a formal constitutional document will 
suffice to protect liberal values and inscribe them upon the society being 
constituted.44  I would even go so far as to maintain that this is precisely 
why and how the international community (both governmental and non-
governmental) operates vis-à-vis incipient nation-states.45  As Bernard 
Yack has acknowledged, “written constitutions are often attempts to estab-
lish . . . what are seen as rational principles of government.”46  The sense 
seems to be that if a formal constitution that incorporates liberal concepts 
is instituted, the rest will take care of itself in time.  On its face this seems 
an unwarranted and faulty conclusion.  Yet this is precisely what passes for 
most constitutionalist discourse today.47   
In what follows I will briefly discuss the four cornerstones of modern 
constitutionalism, tracing their development and entrenchment in an at-
tempt to substantiate my claim that their application has frequently led to 
the sort of conflation and formalism that I critique above.  I begin by look-
ing at the notion of divided and limited government.  This concept, made 
popular during the Middle Ages in Europe, sets the stage for a particular 
conception of civil society; a conception which sets the individual in oppo-
sition to society in a antagonistic way.48  This view, of course, was devel-
oped most fully during the seventeenth century by John Locke.49  I then 
move to the dependent concepts of individual liberties and property rights.  
These expectations further cordon off the individual from civil society in a 
way that (perhaps forever) solidified our notions of individuals against the 
state.50  The constellation of ideas surrounding individual rights and liber-
ties has molded (if not contorted) modern constitutionalism in an unmis-
takable way.  In a similar way, the modern notion of property ownership, 
with its restrictions against state intervention and the expectation of invio-
  
 43. See Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World xix (Douglas 
Greenberg et al. eds., Oxford U. Press 1993). 
 44. See Schochet, supra n. 42. 
 45. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Into the Heart of the State: Intervention Through Constitution-
Making, 8 Temp. Intl & Comp. L.J. 315, 317 (1994). 
 46. Yack, supra n. 6, at 100. 
 47. This is particularly true amongst the work of political scientists.  See The Constitution of Good 
Societies (Karol Edward Soltan & Stephen L. Elkin eds., The Pa. St. U. Press 1996); A New Constitu-
tionalism: Designing Political Institutions for a Good Society (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward 
Soltan, eds., The U. of Chi. Press 1993); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 Va. 
L. Rev. 771 (1997) (showing legal theorists are not immune to this impulse). 
 48. Hayek, supra n. 8, at 119-23. 
 49. Locke, supra n. 25, at 77-133. 
 50. Id. 
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lability, has left an indelible mark on modern constitutionalism.51  Finally, 
I briefly look at the rise of representative democracy in the context of con-
stitutionalist discourse.  It has been frequently noted that democracy and 
constitutionalism are concepts that may in fact be contradictory.52  They 
are, in any event, at least in tension with one another.53   
It is important to note that none of the concepts that I identify as cor-
nerstones of modern constitutionalism are intrinsically problematic.  In-
deed, countless works devoted to these ideas have been penned during the 
last four hundred years that show their importance in certain contexts.54  
What I mean to suggest here is that these ideas, as they developed and have 
been implemented during the last century or more, are honored more in the 
breach than in their actual application.  Essentially, watered-down and 
moribund approximations of these concepts have been articulated and em-
ployed in the context of constitution-making.55  The commitment to the 
ideals is undermined by the superficiality and merely formalist move to try 
and implement these political concepts in a universalizing and totalizing 
way.56  Nothing can illustrate this better than the development of limited 
government. 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IN MODERN 
NATION-STATES 
Constitutionalism, in virtually all of its formulations, plays on the con-
cept that there are two levels of legal and political discourse.  The first is 
the fundamental law (or sometimes “higher” law) of a political entity.57  
This is the constitution, proper.  Below this is a second, subservient set of 
  
 51. F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 124-27 (The U. of Chi. Press 1960). 
 52. See e.g. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (The U. of Chi. Press 1956); Lane, 
supra n. 1, at 243-44. 
 53. Ronald Dworkin, Constitutionalism and Democracy, 3 Eur. J. Phil. 2 (1995); Lane, supra n. 1, at 
ch. 11; Habermas, supra n. 28. 
 54. The corpus of Western liberalism is filled with such discussions.  Theorists from Aristotle to 
Unger have discussed these ideas in various contexts.   
 55. See ButleRitchie, supra n. 16.  
 56. It may be claimed, then, that I am really not taking issue with the concepts qua concepts, but 
with their application.  Fair enough.  Being the legal realist that I am, however, leads me to cling to the 
idea that a concept is only as good as it performs in application.  Since the last century (at least) has 
shown us that high ideals often yield despicable results, I am convinced that we must start with the 
ideals and work forward to the results.  Admittedly, this bucks the trend of starting with the undesirable 
results and working back to the concepts.  Such a procedure never seems to yield the proper effects, 
though.  As a result, I begin this examination of the sketchy application of these important constitution-
alist concepts with the concepts in order to see if the problem lies not just in their incomplete and 
superficial application, but in the heart of the concepts themselves. 
 57. Grey, supra n. 3, at 189-95. 
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laws that are seen as derivations from the first.58  This hierarchy is what 
gives modern constitutionalism its basic structure, and is why many (per-
haps most) people see constitutionalism as a necessary step in the founding 
(or re-founding) of a polity.  This structure serves as a legitimation of gov-
ernment authority and is the basis of the rule of law.  This institutional 
structure is probably second nature to most of us.  It is completely depend-
ent, however, on the idea that government can, and should, be limited by 
structural constraints contained in this fundamental or “higher” law; the 
constitution.59 
The idea that a constitution is designed to limit the power of the sover-
eign is quite old.  Francis Wormuth has traced the concept back through 
Jean Bodin in the sixteenth century,60 Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth,61 
and finally to the Germanic tribes of the very early medieval period.62  
Charles McIlwain disputes the claim of Teutonic heritage, instead main-
taining that the idea arose first in Roman thought.63  He says, for instance: 
[O]ne of the greatest contributions to constitutionalism was the 
distinction [made by the Romans], more clearly than it had been 
made before, or was to be made for long afterwards, between the 
jus publicum and the jus privatum – a distinction that lies to this 
day behind the whole history of our legal safeguards of the rights 
of the individual against encroachment of government.64   
McIlwain’s argument is persuasive, but ultimately the exact derivation 
of the concept matters little for our present discussion.  It was certainly the 
case that Locke had accepted this dichotomy between state and the indi-
vidual by the seventeenth century,65 and the notion that this split necessi-
tated protections of the individual from the power of the state in the form 
of limitations on governmental (or, more properly, sovereign) action was 
firmly entrenched by the eighteenth century.66 
As we can see here, there is a link between the hierarchical nature of 
constitutional government and the split between public and private realms 
of action.  It is because individuals are seen as existing against the state 
  
 58. Michelman, supra n. 19, at 298. 
 59. Grey, supra n. 3, at 189-95. 
 60. See Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (Blackwell Press 1955). 
 61. See Question XC, On the Question of Law, in Summa Theologica in Introduction to St. Thomas 
Aquinas (Anton C. Pegis ed., Modern Library 1948). 
 62. Wormuth, supra n. 4, at chs. 1, 4, 5.  Lane seems to accept this view.  See Lane, supra n. 1, at  
19-21.  Otto von Gierke also apparently endorsed this view as well.  See McIlwain, supra n. 4, at ch. 3. 
 63. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at 40-46. 
 64. Id. at 46. 
 65. See Locke, supra n. 25. 
 66. As evidenced, for example, by the work of Alexander Hamilton, et al., supra note 26.  See also 
Wormuth, supra n. 4, at 1. 
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that limitations on government are needed.67  The two entities need to forge 
a workable relationship allowing both to serve their proper ends.  The fun-
damental law (the constitution) then, is seen as a compact between private 
actors and the public power of the state.68  Key to this account is the notion 
of sovereignty.  While this is not the place to develop or trace a fully-
fledged account of sovereignty,69 a little must be said here in order to show 
how the notions of limited government and the public/private split on po-
litical actors intersect.70  In some ways, the notion of sovereignty may be 
seen as a keystone holding this entire liberal conception of state and indi-
vidual together.71 
During the early modern period, the notion of state power was seen as 
residing in a single individual, the monarch or sovereign.  This is undoubt-
edly another legacy of imperial Roman practice.  Sovereignty was the ex-
ercise of this power by the rightful authority of the state entity.72  As Tho-
mas Hobbes put it, “[a]nd he that carryeth this person, is called Soveraigne, 
and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his Subject.”73  
This consolidation of sovereign power in one individual was endorsed and 
espoused by Jean Bodin in his Six Books of the Commonwealth, and was 
widely practiced by the monarchs of medieval Europe.74  Wormuth ac-
knowledges this when he says, “[t]o Bodin, as to the whole school of 
politiques, it appeared that the very existence of society was possible only 
if there were some overriding power capable of exacting complete obedi-
ence from all subjects.”75 
The arbitrary exercise of this power, however, was seen as a transgres-
sion against individual members of the state.76  Absolute power of the sort 
espoused by Bodin and others necessarily meant that the sovereign was 
above the law.77   For reasons obvious to us today, this was troubling for 
many in medieval Europe.  In fact, there existed an alternative view to the 
one advanced by Bodin.  This alternative view has been traced to the thir-
  
 67. Locke, supra n. 25, at §§ 77-131. 
 68. Locke, supra n. 25, at §§113-14. 
 69. See J. Bartleson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge U. Press 1995); Georges Bataille, The 
Accursed Share, Vols. II and III (Zone Books 1991); F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (2d. ed., Cambridge U. 
Press 1986); S.D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton U. Press 1999). 
 70. For an interesting discussion that problematizes the public/private split, see Otto Kirchheimer, In 
Quest of Sovereignty, 6 J. Pol. 139 (1944). 
 71. See Krasner, supra n. 69, at ch. 1. 
 72. See generally Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Everyman’s Library 1965). 
 73. Id. at 90. 
 74. Lane, supra n. 1, at 44-50. 
 75. Wormuth, supra n. 4, at 29. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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teenth century British jurist, Henry of Bracton.78  Bracton maintained that a 
King above law was like a horse without a bridle.79  Indeed, McIlwain at-
tributes directly to Bracton the very modern idea that a sovereign may only 
exercise power legitimately when he does so according to law.80  He even 
goes so far as to claim that the notion of sovereign power flowing from the 
people to the sovereign, and that this relationship checks the power of the 
sovereign to act arbitrarily in matters pertaining to the common good, was 
first devised by Bracton.81   
McIlwain describes this divorce as a division between jurisdictio and 
gubernaculum.82  This is the division between the formal offices of gov-
ernment and the actual management of state.  He traces the evolution of 
this rift throughout the middle ages by examining the English common law 
developments that limited the absolute power of the sovereign.83  During 
this period, the British judiciary assumed an ever more powerful social 
role.  This increased stature gave judges the power to challenge the King 
on issues concerning the governance of English society.  In effect, the Eng-
lish judiciary bridled the sovereign between the thirteenth and sixteenth 
centuries.84  The idea that a sovereign may only exercise his power legiti-
mately when acting according to delimited powers under law was devel-
oped over several centuries. 
Thomas Hobbes picked up this concept during the seventeenth cen-
tury.85  Francis Wormuth identifies this as a direct result of the English 
civil war.86   In any event, Hobbes’ famous Leviathan87 was aimed at ad-
dressing the arbitrary abuse of power, and constructing the proper ordering 
of the public sphere.88  Here, we see the first real move to formalize consti-
tutionalist principles.  Hobbes was a materialist and formalist by tempera-
ment, and saw the relationship between state and the individual in rational-
ist terms.89  According to his view, the sovereign and his subjects maintain 
a legal relationship, one of agency.90  While the legal characterization of 
this relationship was an important one for Hobbes, he did not suppose that 
the nature of the relationship itself was sufficient to cast the rights and re-
  
 78. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at 67-68. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at ch. 5. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Hobbes, supra n. 72.  
 86. Wormuth, supra n. 4, at 57, 59. 
 87. Hobbes, supra n. 72. 
 88. See id. at chs. 17-25. 
 89. See e.g. Michael Ridge, Hobbesian Public Reason, 108 Ethics 538 (1998). 
 90. See generally Hobbes, supra n. 72, at ch. 18. 
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sponsibilities of both parties in stone.91  This is why limitations on the 
power of the state were so important.  Limitation on state power was ac-
complished by constructing a contractual relationship between the sover-
eign and the individual - the social contract.92  The social contract was a 
fiction designed to orient the terms of state limitation.93  This notion of the 
social contract would play a pivotal role in the development of the modern 
state system, a notion that was picked up by (among others) John Locke.94 
As I have said, the idea of a social contract was developed to explain 
and describe this rationalist vision of state ordering along formalist lines.95  
The nature of political ordering was seen, in this formulation, as nothing 
more than a natural and logical legal relationship.96  The sovereign acts as 
agent for his subjects.  This agency relationship justifies the continued 
maintenance of the social contract.  In other words, the power of the sover-
eign is dependent on the recognition and protection of private ends.97  Con-
stitutions are important in this account because they explicitly set forth the 
terms by which the agency relationship can be exercised.98  The social con-
tract is, after all, a contract.  As Locke puts it: 
Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and inde-
pendent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the 
political power of another without his consent, which is done by 
agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a community for 
their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, one amongst another, 
in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security 
against any that are not of it.99 
While Locke did not develop a fully formed notion of the social con-
tract,100 as did other liberal theorists,101 he relied on the idea heavily in his 
conceptualization of the proper relationship between the state and its sub-
jects.  In fact, it may reasonably be said that the entire corpus of Locke’s 
political work was devoted to justifying the restraint of sovereign power.102  
  
 91. Id.; McIlwain, supra n. 4, at 125. 
 92. See generally Social Contract Essays by: Locke, Hume, Rousseau Intro (Ernest Barker ed., 
Oxford U. Press 1976). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Locke, supra n. 25. 
 95. See generally Yack, supra n. 6; Toulmin, supra n. 29. 
 96. See generally Yack, supra n. 6; Toulmin, supra n. 29. 
 97. See generally Lane, supra n. 1, chs. 2, 3. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Locke, supra n. 25, at 164. 
 100. Franz Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State 23 (The Free Press 1957). 
 101. See Social Contract Essays by: Locke, Hume, Rousseau, supra n. 92. 
 102. See generally Leslie Armour, John Locke and American Constitutionalism, in Constitutional-
ism: The Philosophical Dimension, supra n. 34, at 9. 
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The state was, for Locke, a necessary condition to the full actualization of 
the individual, but as an institution it should be constrained and narrowly 
confined to providing the conditions for liberty.103  Confining the state to 
its limited role, according to Locke, is what creates room for liberty to 
flourish.  This has been identified as Locke’s notion of constitutionalism; a 
theory which is deeply tied to his metaphysics and epistemology.104   
The next major player in this tale is Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron 
de Montesquieu.105  Montesquieu accepted the Lockean notion of limited 
government.106  He said, for example, that: 
[C]onstant experience shows us that every man invested with 
power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will 
go.  Is it not strange, though true, to say that virtue itself has need 
of limits?  To prevent this abuse it is necessary from the very na-
ture of things that power should be a check to power.  A constitu-
tion may be such that no man shall be compelled to do things 
which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from 
things which the law permits.107 
Montesquieu also began his analysis of constitutionalist ideas from a ra-
tionalist stance.108  At the very beginning of The Spirit of the Laws, Mon-
tesquieu said “[t]here is, then, a prime reason; and laws are the relations 
subsisting between it and different beings, and the relations of these to one 
another.”109  Guy Lafrance has said that for Montesquieu, “[t]here is fun-
damentally a concern for scientificity, a concern for positive knowledge 
which is constantly expressed in the desire to link up the law with sociohis-
torical data.”110  There is evidence to suggest that Montesquieu was much 
closer to Jean-Jacques Rousseau concerning his views on the connection of 
a form of government to a specific people,111 but his rationalist tendencies 
are relevant here.  So what does Montesquieu’s rationalism add to this con-
stitutionalist picture?  It is Montesquieu who introduces the concept of 
further diluting the notion of sovereignty by separating the powers of gov-
  
 103. Locke, supra n. 25, at 164, 189, 190; see Lane, supra n. 1, at 51-53. 
 104. See Armour, supra n. 102 (detailed account of what motivates Locke to adopt this set of posi-
tions). 
 105. See Robert Shackleton, Essays on Montesquieu and the Enlightenment (Voltaire Found. 1988). 
 106. Guy Lafrance, Montesquieu and Rousseau on Constitutional Theory, in Constitutionalism: The 
Philosophical Dimension, supra n. 34, at 55. 
 107. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws bk. XI, ch. 4, 150 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publg. 
Co. 1949) (originally published 1773). 
 108. Lafrance, supra n. 106, at 55. 
 109. Montesquieu, supra n. 107, at bk. I, ch. 1, 1. 
 110. Lafrance, supra n. 106, at 55. 
 111. Id. 
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ernment into different departments.112  This is a further compartmentaliza-
tion and limitation of the structure and role of government, reductions fur-
ther carried out by the institution of a positivist constitutional text.113   
The last major focus in this evolution is on the works of Thomas 
Paine114 and James Madison.115  It was the work of the American founders, 
more than any single theorist before, who unified previous rationalist vi-
sions into a coherent whole.116  Paine captured clearly the founders’ view 
on constitutionalism when he said that a written constitution is “to liberty, 
what a grammar is to language.”117  A vital part of Paine’s view is that a 
constitution is a formal and antecedent document that necessarily precedes 
the institution of government.118  To this, Madison added the notion that 
this compact that predates the formation of the state must incorporate the 
constraint of limited and divided government, accepting in whole cloth the 
views of Locke and Montesquieu.119  He further developed these notions, 
however, by adding the proviso that the divided powers should be checked 
against one another, a further limiting device.120  Madison also endorsed 
the view, derived undoubtedly from Locke,121 that the people are the 
source of sovereign power, and that the constitution is a grant of that power 
to the government.122  Limiting government through discrete mechanisms 
designed to diffuse and disperse power so that individuals in society can 
attain private ends was the goal of the American founders.123  Richard Kay 
has explained this in the following way: “These two elements—first, that 
there is a proper and improper use of state authority and, second, that the 
means of confining its exercise to proper uses are the promulgation and 
enforcement of positive law [through a constitutional document]—remain 
the defining features of American constitutionalism.”124  There is a positiv-
ist and overly rationalistic impulse shot through most of the early Ameri-
  
 112. See Lane, supra n. 1, at 54; Lafrance, supra n. 106, at 61. 
 113. See e.g. David Spitz, Some Animadversions on Montesquieu’s Theory of Freedom, 63 Ethics 207 
(1953). 
 114. See e.g. Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1951). 
 115. Hamilton, supra n. 26. 
 116. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution ch. 3 
(Knopf Books 1996). 
 117. McIlwain, supra n. 4, at 2. 
 118. Id. at 9. 
 119. James W. Muller, The American Framers’ Debt to Montesquieu, in The Revival of Constitution-
alism 91 (James W. Muller ed., U. of Neb. Press 1988). 
 120. Lane, supra n. 1, at 55-56. 
 121. Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations 
18 (Larry Alexander ed., Cambridge U. Press 1998). 
 122. Hamilton, supra n. 26, at 294. 
 123. Rakove, supra n. 116, at ch. 3. 
 124. Kay, supra n. 121, at 19. 
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can constitutionalist discourse.125  Michael Kammen has described this as 
the impulse to create “a machine that would go of itself.”126 
We see throughout the modern period several interdependent concepts 
that have played key roles in the development of modern constitutionalism.  
Clearly the belief that government should be limited in its ability to use its 
power against individuals is the chief concern of modern political thinkers.  
In order for this concept to take hold, however, several related concepts 
needed to develop.  First the dichotomy between state and subject had to 
take root.  Then the idea that sovereignty can (and should) be divorced 
from an all-powerful monarch was needed.  Once power was divested from 
the sovereign and deposited amongst the people, the mechanisms of di-
vided government and checks and balances would ensure that it remained 
there.  In theory, the division of powers can be seen as a sort of entropy 
that undermines any possibility of consolidating government power in the 
hands of a few.  Finally, the notion that the proper relationship between the 
individual and the weakened sovereign was one of agency solidified the 
now widely held belief that the only legitimate end of the nation-state is to 
serve the needs of the individual so that she can attain private interests.   
In making these moves, theorists like Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu 
and the American founders continually delineated and redacted legitimate 
state functions, which posited ever smaller and confined areas of public 
action.  The law and the constitution which enabled the law, are simply a 
means to an end—a very particular end.127  The constitution is a charter.  In 
this modernist formulation, writing a constitution is nothing more than 
reducing the contract between the state and the individual to a formal 
document.128  This has had a tremendous impact on the history of constitu-
tionalism, and I would go so far as to say that it dominates the conception 
that most constitutionalists have of founding acts today.  Constitutions are, 
in important respects, foundational.129  They certainly do set out the basic 
relationship between individuals and the state.  This impulse cannot be 
resisted too fervently.  But neither can we afford to turn this impulse into 
an ontology. 
  
 125. Charles R. Kelser, The Founders and the Classics, in Muller, supra n. 119, at 62. 
 126. Michael G. Kammen, A Machine that Would Go of Itself: The Constitution in American Culture 
(Knopf Books 1986); see also Yack, supra n. 6, at 109. 
 127. Schochet, supra n. 42, at 8. 
 128. A manifestation of this can be found in the desire to quantify aspects of constitutionalism, and to 
design templates that can be used to write constitutions.  For the former, see Hene Van Maarseveen & 
Ger Van Der Tang, Written Constitutions: A Computerized Comparative Study (Oceana 1978).  Exam-
ples of the latter can be found in Albert P. Blaustein, Framing the Modern Constitution: A Checklist 
(Phila. Const. Found. 1993) and Bernard H. Siegan, Drafting a Constitution for a Nation of Republic 
Emerging into Freedom (2d ed., George Mason U. Press 1994). 
 129. Jacques Derrida, The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, In Admiration, in For Nelson Man-
dela 13 (Jacques Derrida & Tlili Mustapha eds., Seaver Books 1987). 
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An important part of my critique is the setting in motion of a belief that 
these ideas are both necessary and sufficient.  All throughout the work of 
Hobbes, Locke, and the American founders, we see an emphasis on the 
restraints and formalist conceptions of state and legal ordering.  This is the 
often-noted focus on negative liberty.130  In other words, there is an un-
stated presumption in liberal theory that creating the conditions for liberty 
by restraining state power is enough.  We never see a deeper appreciation 
of the need for positive conditions that enable individuals to attain the sorts 
of private ends that liberal theorists champion.131  Nor do we see any con-
nection between the positivist constitutional structures and the cultural, 
social, and historical situation of states being constituted.  It must be noted 
in the context of the present discussion that the liberal insistence on limited 
government, with its corollaries of popular sovereignty and the split be-
tween public and private actors, proceeds from the tacit assumption that 
such restriction is sufficient to create the conditions under which liberty 
can thrive.132  In my view, it is the focus on these issues that has led di-
rectly to the sort of superficial and ineffectual constitutional documents we 
have seen during the last century.  
A related, and perhaps dependent development in liberal political the-
ory has had an enormous effect on the development of constitutionalism 
during the modern period - the institution of individual rights.133  The de-
velopment of individual rights regimes has dominated political and legal 
theories for centuries, and as will be seen in the next section, I believe that 
the way in which they are implemented mirrors the formulaic move out-
lined above. 
V.  MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
For the modernist political and legal project, structural constraints 
through divided and limited government only provided so much protection.  
These mechanisms, as has been said, diffused and enfeebled the institu-
tions of government in a manner that created a space for individuals who 
strove for a place against the state and its power.  It was widely feared that 
this would not be enough, and in the words of John Selden, “this little gap 
of man’s liberty may in time go out.”134  This space needed a structure to 
maintain itself, a set of mechanisms that would support the weight of indi-
  
 130. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Clarendon Press 1958). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Schochet, supra n. 42, at 4-8. 
 133. See Rights (Carlos Nino ed., N.Y. U. Reference Collection 1992). 
 134. Hayek, supra n. 51, at 205. 
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vidual claims against further state intervention and encroachment.  This 
structure was provided by the concept of individual rights and liberties.135  
The attachment of rights to individuals who are poised against state author-
ity provides some recourse against illegitimate governmental overreach-
ing.136  As Gary Bryner puts it, “[c]onstitutional governments are estab-
lished primarily, in theory, to assure individual rights, and their constitu-
tions are designed to assure governmental respect for those rights.”137  Dis-
cussing individual rights has become a cottage industry amongst liberal 
political theorists.138  “Rights talk,” as it has come to be known, is virtually 
synonymous with modern conceptions of constitutional government.139 
Locke identified a narrow set of rights (“life, liberty and property”) as 
preconditions for civil society.140  His conceptualization was derived from 
his notion of natural law and was distinctly imbued with the idea that the 
covenant between sovereign and subject was dependent on the mainte-
nance of this moral pact.141  This was an idea that was later to play an im-
portant role in the rhetoric surrounding both the American Declaration of 
Independence and the institution of the U.S. Constitution.142  This natural 
law foundation for rights has lost its luster, however.  During the last 150 
years or so, most political and legal theorists have derived the foundation 
for basic conceptions of rights from the need to further protect individuals 
from arbitrary state power, not from any universal conception of natural 
law.143  Again, the mechanisms employed to provide this protection are 
abstract and formal in nature.  Seen in this way, they are little more than 
extensions of the basic liberal program of putting government in its proper 
place.144  In short, they are rules restricting government action; simply put, 
positive protections against state encroachments.145 
Joel Feinberg has said that a “man has a legal right when the official 
recognition of his claim (as valid) is called for by the governing rules.”146  
In this context, the constitutional text provides the governing rules.  In or-
  
 135. See Rights, supra n. 133. 
 136. See Gary C. Bryner, Constitutionalism and the Politics of Rights, in Constitutionalism and 
Rights (Gary C. Bryner & Noel B. Reynolds eds., Brigham Young U. Press 1987). 
 137. Id. at 7. 
 138. See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard U. Press 1977). 
 139. Dworkin says, for instance, that constitutionalism is “a system that establishes individual legal 
rights that the dominant legislature does not have the power to override or compromise.”  Dworkin, 
supra n. 53, at 2. 
 140. Locke, supra n. 25, at §§ 22-23. 
 141. Locke, supra n. 25, at §§ 22-23; Armour, supra n. 102, at 24-27. 
 142. Armour, supra n. 102, at 24-27. 
 143. See generally Schochet, supra n. 42. 
 144. Rakove, supra n. 116, at 18-19. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, in Philosophy of Law 304, 311 (Joel Feinberg & 
Jules Coleman eds., 7th ed., Wadsworth 2004). 
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der for an individual to have the opportunity to pursue private ends, the 
governing rules set out by the contract between the individual and the state 
must explicitly define and acknowledge basic rights.147  In this formulation, 
rights are legal fictions that protect certain interests that are deemed to be 
important in the context of the political and social community.148  This is a 
purely abstract and procedural conception that shuns the substance of 
rights bearing.  This is contrasted with the more robust conception of rights 
based in moral discourse.149  As Habermas explains, “the legal community, 
which is always localized in space and time, protects the integrity of its 
members precisely insofar as they acquire the artificial status of rights-
bearers.”150  Rights here, properly speaking “constitutional rights,” are 
positivist structures that give individuals certain claims to safe space in 
which to pursue their own visions of the good.151  Roberto Unger explains 
it this way: 
[This] cluster of entitlements creates an island of security against 
the predatory or reformist actions of the state, a haven in which 
some material or ideal interest, and the actual person who is its 
bearer, can hide.  So long as it remains within its protected zone, 
the interest cannot be struck dead.  Conversely, this operation im-
mobilizes a parcel of the state’s capacity to move and shake the 
social world.152 
To use Ronald Dworkin’s language, a right is a trump against the interven-
tion into this vision of the good by government action.153   
In forging the compact between individual and the state, it has become 
widespread practice to presume that the rights of individuals should be 
prominently guarded and entrenched.154  But how do we know how big a 
space to carve out in order for individuals to seek their own ends?  In other 
words, what rights should a constitutional document protect?  This is the 
source of a good deal of debate, especially amongst contemporary constitu-
tional founders.155  The seat of contention seems to be between what have 
  
 147. Dworkin, supra n. 138, at 184. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at ch. 10. 
 150. Habermas, On the Internal Relation Between the Rule of Law and Democracy, supra n. 28, at 
14. 
 151. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, False Necessity:Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service 
of Radical Democracy 131 (Verso 2001). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Dworkin, supra n. 138, at ch. 7. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See e.g. Albie Sachs, Speech, Some Lessons from the South African Experience of Constitution-
making: The Role of the Constitutional Court in Reconciling People in a Divided Society (Mansion 
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been called “negative” and “positive” rights.156  In order not to derail my 
focus on the effect that rights (in the broadest sense of the term) have had 
on the modern institution of constitutionalism, let me simply note that this 
distinction concentrates on the difference between protecting individuals 
from encroachment and enabling them to achieve their ends by providing 
the conditions necessary for them to achieve these ends, the difference 
between form and substance.  I believe this debate is overly Manichean,157 
focusing too much on what defines the good.158  In any event, for our pur-
poses here, it is enough to say that constitutional founders invariably at-
tempt to enumerate certain types of rights: rights to political participa-
tion,159 rights to the freedoms of thought and speech,160 rights to engage in 
certain types of relationships (particularly economic relationships),161 and 
rights to exist and thrive in the community162 are all common in constitu-
tional documents.   
I maintained at the outset of this paper that all four of the cornerstones 
of modern constitutionalism (of which liberal conceptions of rights is the 
second) serve to lead constitutional founders to a superficial understanding 
of their task.  Positivist conceptions of individual rights are perhaps the 
clearest example of my point.  By embracing a limited number of basic 
rights (the number fluctuates between a dozen or so, in the American ver-
sion, to several dozen, in some European constitutions), contemporary 
founders presume that the conditions for creating a healthy and robust civil 
society are satisfied.  Scant discussion is had, however, concerning the 
ability of individuals to effectively use these enumerated rights.   
Rights have become the boilerplate of the modern constitution.163  In 
order to be accepted as legitimate by other actors, invariably governmental 
and nongovernmental actors on the international stage, an incipient consti-
  
House, Dublin, Oct. 21, 1996) (copy of text of this lecture can be found online at: http://rcswww.urz.tu-
dresden.de/~schrenk/research.htm (last viewed Oct. 20, 2004)). 
 156. Berlin, supra n. 130. 
 157. For a good discussion taking a similar stance, see Richard L. Lippke, The Elusive Distinction 
Between Negative and Positive Rights, 33 S. J. Phil. 335 (1995). 
 158. Hayek, supra n. 51, at ch. 1. 
 159. Examples include Article II of the Constitution of the French Federal Republic of 1958; Article 
21 of the German Basic Law; and Article 50 of the Constitution of Norway. 
 160. Examples include the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Article 5 of the German Basic 
Law; and Article 10 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, incorporated into the 
Constitution of the Fifth French Republic of 1958 through Article 2, paragraph 1.   
 161. Examples would be the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Articles 14 
and 15 of the German Basic Law; Article 17 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen; and 
Articles 104-107 of the Constitution of Norway. 
 162. See Article 12 of the German Basic Law; Articles 6, 7 and 11 of the Constitution of the Fourth 
French Republic of 1946. 
 163. Lane, supra n. 1, at 137-42. 
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tution must contain an enumerated list of certain rights.164  If the document 
contains those rights, it is accepted as a legitimate attempt to incorporate 
liberal notions of liberty.  This judgment is made regardless of the connec-
tion of these rights to the actual conditions on the ground in a forming or 
re-forming polity.  In other words, just because the language of rights is 
incorporated into a founding document, founders (and others) presume that 
liberty will flow as a natural and invariable consequence.  One need only 
look at the recent history of modern constitutionalism to see the scrapheap 
of constitutional texts which contained such enumerated lists of rights that 
failed to either protect the members of the society, or establish an enduring 
polity to substantiate this position.165 
An excellent illustration of this is the specific guarantees that are in-
variably incorporated into modernist constitutional documents protecting 
the right to own property.  While these particular sets of rights166 are 
somewhat contentious in contemporary discourse,167 they have always 
played an important role in the conception of modern constitutionalism that 
I have developed above.  I next turn to a discussion of these rights, focus-
ing further on how their entrenchment has further formalized the positivist 
enterprise of the enlightenment. 
VI.  THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNERSHIP IN THE SCHEMA 
OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
As I noted at the outset of the last section, John Locke identified the 
right to own property as central to his notion of liberal society.168  This 
identification of private property ownership with liberal conceptions of the 
relationship between sovereign and citizen runs deep in the West.169  It has 
been identified as one of the primary motivating factors of the American 
founders, who thought that “the protection of private property . . . is con-
ducive of progress, order and justice.”170  Jefferson, among others, seemed 
  
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. I characterize private property protections as “a set of rights” because the notion of private 
ownership hinges on a panoply of interdependent concepts.  Without the correlative rights of contract 
and other economic protections the right to own property would be meaningless.  For a good discussion 
of this see Anthony Ogus, Property Rights and Freedom of Economic Activity, in Constitutionalism 
and Rights: The Influence of the United States Constitution Abroad 125-50 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. 
Rosenthal eds., Columbia U. Press 1990). 
 167. See e.g. Radical Philosophy of Law: Contemporary Challenges to Mainstream Legal Theory 
and Practice (David S. Caudill & Steven Jay Gold eds., Humanities Press 1995). 
 168. Locke, supra n. 25, at §§ 26, 31, 34, 37, 41, 42. 
 169. Hayek, supra n. 8, at 123. 
 170. Gotfried Dietz, In Defense of Property 199 (Henry Regnery, Co. 1963). 
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to believe that protecting private ownership of property is a prerequisite of 
freedom.171  Liberalism hinges in large part on society recognizing and 
protecting private property rights.172  The recognition of this right, often in 
absolutist terms, drives and reinscribes the alienation of the individual 
from the state.173  In other words, this is a concrete manifestation of the 
public/private dichotomy discussed above.  Positing a right to own prop-
erty, though, does not lead to the inevitability that individuals in the state 
can or will be able to own property.  Like the notions of divided and lim-
ited government, and the more general concept of individual rights dis-
cussed above, the private property rights enunciated in most constitutional 
documents are merely positivist ideals of a strictly formal sort.174  I will 
briefly outline the arguments that many supporters of such rights advance.  
Once this is accomplished, I will examine the presumption that purely 
positive protections contained in a constitutional text can affect the sort of 
connection between concept and reality that many constitutionalists as-
sume.  As I maintain throughout, I believe this to be unlikely at best. 
The story that Locke tells about the relationship between the individual 
and the state is a compelling one.  He builds upon the space created for 
individual action (by wresting political power away from the sovereign) by 
vesting the newly liberated individual with certain inalienable attributes.175  
Principle among these is the right to own and maintain property.176  In fact, 
the primary role of the state is to ensure that others do not encroach upon 
this right.  If this right is protected, in Locke’s account, industrious indi-
viduals could pursue their own ends with the assurance that their labor 
would be secure.177  The contract between state and the individual made 
the sovereign the protector of the individual’s property.178  This is the 
foundation of an economic system that is independent of state control or 
governmental apparatus.179  For Locke, as for many who followed him, the 
zone of individual action created by the constitutionalist structure would be 
filled by the private economy of free and autonomous individuals seeking 
  
 171. Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe 
and America 259 (4th ed., Blaisdell Publishing Co. 1968).  James Madison agreed.  See Bryner, supra 
n. 136, at 12.  Alexander Hamilton was apparently of this opinion as well.  See Paul Eidelberg, The 
Philosophy of the American Constitution: A Reinterpretation of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers 
126 (The Free Press 1968). 
 172. Unger, supra n. 151, at 21. 
 173. Louis Althusser, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Marx 140-41 (Verso 1982). 
 174. Lane, supra n. 1, at 60. 
 175. Locke, supra n. 25, at §§ 22-23. 
 176. Id. at §§ 25-51. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
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an ever larger part of the available resources.180  This economic account 
was accepted and expanded upon by Adam Smith, who maintained that 
this sort of system created the conditions for a healthy social system.181  
There is another more basic justification for such a system, however, one 
that focuses more clearly on the autonomy of the individual. 
The conservative constitutional theorist Friedrich Hayek has main-
tained that private property is the primary protection against coercion.182  
More than checking the power of government through structural mecha-
nisms, or the more diffuse political liberties associated with general grants 
of individual rights, then, the institutionalization of property protects the 
individual as autonomous political actor from arbitrary political power.183  
He draws this from a Kantian conception of individual autonomy that fur-
ther entrenches the individualism inherent in modern constitutionalism.184  
Important in this particular formulation is not that individuals actually con-
trol property (as one might presume), but that the instrumentality of its 
possible control is divested from public actors.185  Autonomy means the 
ability to possibly control one’s own ends through the accumulation of 
private wealth.  The private space becomes larger, and the sphere of le-
gitimate state action continues to shrink. 
This account was incorporated whole cloth into the American constitu-
tional scheme.186  The American founders were preoccupied with the pro-
tection of a property ownership regime that vested nearly absolute author-
ity in individuals who had property.187  Here a tension arises between the 
selfish and the institutional reasons for implementing private property pro-
tections.188  Many of the founders were, of course, holders of vast amounts 
of personal and private wealth and property.189  Many were also idealists, 
however.190  When Madison wrote in The Federalist, No. 10 that the con-
stitution should protect “different and unequal faculties of acquiring prop-
erty” he was certainly attempting to justify the economic status quo, but he 
  
 180. Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy 210 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999); 
Unger, supra n. 151, at 21-22. 
 181. See Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 277-78 (Clar-
endon Press 1976); Hardin, supra n. 180, at 70. 
 182. Hayek, supra n. 51, at 140.   
 183. Id. 
 184. Ogus, supra n. 166, at 127. 
 185. Hayek, supra n. 51, at 140-41. 
 186. Rakove, supra n. 116, at chs. 1-3. 
 187. Walter Berns, The ‘New’ Science of Politics and Constitutional Government, in Constitutional-
ism and the Politics of Rights, supra n. 136, at 63-77; Bryner, supra n. 136, at 69. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States ch. 5 
(Macmillian 1986). 
 190. Rakove, supra n. 116, at 15. 
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was also attempting to give expression to the ideas expressed by Locke 
(and later by Kant and Hayek) that protecting this sort of scheme was the 
best way to assure both the individual’s autonomy and the social space 
within which the autonomous individual can seek the good.191  This space 
would become, in modern parlance, “the market.”192 
An important consequence of this scheme cannot be overlooked.  
Theoretically, the private property regime developed to support the argu-
ments in favor of a constitutionalist system advancing the freedom of indi-
viduals against the state, freedom in the form of individual autonomy and a 
space of action (the market) for these autonomous individuals.193  But these 
justifications are normative theories that suggest a connection to natural 
rights that attach to all individuals.  Private property regimes had a more 
selfish justification, however.  To guard against state intervention, minimal 
formal (or negative) mechanisms designed to entrench property rights were 
required.  Protecting against governmental encroachment but maintaining a 
certain type of market necessitated un-tethering the mechanisms of protect-
ing property from the natural law theories supporting the rhetoric of Locke 
and Smith.  Positivist mechanisms guarding against intrusion by the sover-
eign (or others) on an already developing market were placed aside by, and 
in fact justified by, the rhetoric of universal normative ideals.194  This is, in 
my estimation, the root of the fundamental incoherence that makes consti-
tutionalism so frail as an institution today.   
Protecting private property is, in an ideal sense, a rational way of 
maintaining the autonomy of individuals against arbitrary action by the 
state, and theoretically creates a market in which these individuals can seek 
their own visions of the good.195  This ideal must confront the realities of a 
market that is already in development, however.  The idealist rhetoric must 
give way to the positivist realities of constitution building.  Positing a spe-
cific regime of property ownership certainly guards against state interven-
tion, but more importantly it entrenches the status quo in a concretizing 
way.196  Such protections, as we can clearly see from Madison’s view, pro-
tect as much (perhaps more) against uncontrolled private redistributions of 
  
 191. See e.g. Schochet, supra n. 42. 
 192. Hardin, supra n. 180, at 69. 
 193. Rakove, supra n. 116, at 314-16. 
 194. Michael Walzer seems to recognize this tension.  He suggests that the focus on property rights 
undermines the more normative ideal of conscience.  See Michael Walzer, Constitutional Rights and 
the Shape of Civil Society, in The Constitution of the People: Reflections on Citizens and Civil Society 
116 (Robert E. Calvert ed., U. of Kan. Press 1991). 
 195. Hayek, supra n. 51, at 222-28. 
 196. As Unger explains, “[t]he legal rights and governmental institutions sustaining them made 
possible a basic continuity of the elites.  In their historical setting, the engrossment of leaseholds and 
the factory system represented advances in the degree of command over large pools of land, capital, 
and labor that could be exercised by large-scale enterprises.”  Unger, supra n. 151, at 288. 
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property during or after regime change as they do against arbitrary state 
action.  In Roberto Unger’s words, “the constitution [is] a device by which 
to exhibit and sustain some determinate scheme of social division and hier-
archy.”197  In this context (and perhaps others as well) the aspirations of 
modern constitutionalism are supported by normative imperatives but put 
into action by positivist mechanisms.  This tension is not accidental.  Con-
stitutional texts are not political and social ideals made concrete.  They are 
imperfect approximations at best, and given the fact that they are imple-
mented mid-stream in the historical and cultural circumstances of a form-
ing (or re-forming) polity, it is no wonder that the positivist nature of these 
texts often have the effect of entrenching prevailing power structures (eco-
nomic and political).  
Here again this entrenchment is directly related to the rationalist im-
pulse.198  By attempting to make universal a certain conception of property 
ownership and protection, enlightenment theorists advanced a positivist 
and formal constitutionalist structure that simplified and conflated the ide-
als contained in their rhetoric.  As David Lea has said: 
Modern constitutionalism’s preference for inflexible uniformity 
has meant a constitution of equal citizens who theoretically are 
treated identically, but not necessarily equitably.  In actuality, 
identical treatment has justified the abrogation of earlier accords 
and the refusal to accept cultural and legal diversity, entailing the 
ultimate denial of equitable treatment, as distinct cultural commu-
nities are pushed to assimilate within one dominant system.199 
The enlightenment rationalism that I have discussed above, with its atten-
dant focus on the positivist mechanisms employed in constitutional texts, 
has a totalizing effect on political and social structures.  The reductive 
move and the universalistic impulse of rationalist political and social the-
ory confines and impoverishes innovative ideas about political and legal 
structure.   
This account would seem to run in direct contradiction to the last cor-
nerstone: democracy.  Much of the critical literature on constitutionalism 
suggests that it acts as a protective device for certain interests.200  I think 
there is something profoundly true about this position.  Constitutionalism, 
modern constitutionalism in any event, is an inherently entrenching device.  
If it is the case, then, that the theoretical confines of modern constitutional-
ism are delimited by rationally defined positivist mechanisms that entrench 
  
 197. Id. at 573. 
 198. Toulmin, supra n. 29, at ch. 3. 
 199. David Lea, Tully and de Soto on Uniformity and Diversity, 19 J. Applied Phil. 55, 57 (2002).   
 200. Unger is of this opinion, for example.  See generally Unger, supra n. 151. 
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the political and economic status quo, would not the masses be able to af-
fect this entrenchment through the democratic process?  Perhaps.  This is 
one reason why some maintain that constitutionalism and democracy are, 
at a theoretical level, contradictory concepts.201  I include democracy as the 
last major element of modern constitutionalism because it rounds out the 
narrative of modern constitutionalist discourse.  Its practice, like the prac-
tice of implementing rights regimes, is far different than the rhetoric of 
idealist constitutional discourse.  As will be seen in the next section, de-
mocracy helps sell the idea of constitutionalism, but the constraints built 
into the democratic process by the typical modernist constitutional system 
limits the effect of popular opinion. 
VII.  DEMOCRACY AS A TENET OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The relationship between constitutionalism and democracy is more 
tenuous and complicated than any of the other cornerstones that I have 
identified.  Some have maintained that the two concepts are complimen-
tary, each enabling the other to flourish.202  Others, however, suggest that 
the constraining and restricting nature (i.e., the positivity) of constitutional-
ism runs counter to democratic concepts.203  This debate is lively and ac-
tive, showing some promise concerning the vitality of political theory in 
the new millennium.  My intention is not to play out the parameters of this 
discourse, although I will set forth the basic positions as they are currently 
articulated.  Instead, I will attempt to show how a version of democracy 
has frequently been sold as a corollary to the modernist vision of constitu-
tionalism.204  If this perception is correct, democracy is seen as an out-
growth of constitutionalism.  It is this relationship that allows for the con-
finement of democratic institutions that entrench power structures in cer-
tain ways.  This confinement, if it is true, follows the other three major 
aspects of constitutionalism that I have identified and discussed above. 
A word of caution is necessary here.  Democratic theory is rich and 
varied.  The debates surrounding what constitutes democracy, and how 
democratic reforms can and should be structured, are perhaps the most 
vibrant and vigorous of any in contemporary political theory.205  It would 
  
 201. Dworkin, supra n. 53, at 2. 
 202. See Dworkin, supra n. 53. 
 203. Dahl, supra n. 52, at 90. 
 204. See Dworkin, supra n. 53. 
 205. See Noam Chomsky, Chomsky on Democracy and Education (C. P. Otero ed., RoutledgeFalmer 
2003); Brook Manville, A Company of Citizens: What the First Democracy Teaches About Creating 
Great Organizations (Harvard U. Press 2003); Social Movements and Democracy (Pedro Ibarra ed., 
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be impossible for me to do much justice to this debate here.  I will confine 
my analysis to the relationship between modern constitutionalist theory 
and democratic concepts that implicate and intersect with the terms of con-
stitutionalism.206  In so doing, I will focus primarily on the way that de-
mocratic reforms, as a corollary to constitutionalist structures, exhibit the 
sort of rationalist, formalist and positivist impulses that I have developed 
throughout this paper. 
Democracy was a late addition to the idea of constitutionalism.207  The 
incipient stages of modern constitutionalism (growing out of medieval and 
renaissance structures related to rationalism) did not address the notion that 
people can (or should) have a say in the affairs of state, either directly or 
through representatives.208  As the notion of sovereignty was displaced, 
however, it came to reside—in theory anyway—in “the people.”209  But 
how would “the people” yield such important power given their diffuse 
and scattered nature?  This is, of course, the concept of popular sovereignty 
that serves as the foundation for many articulations of democracy.210  The 
answer to the question of how citizens in whom sovereignty is vested can 
exercise that power is the principle locus of discussion amongst democratic 
theorists.211    
Even if the idea that sovereignty either resides with or emanates from 
the people is accepted, it is by no means the case that it necessarily leads to 
the conclusion that democracy is the form of government that should be 
employed.  Nonetheless, modern constitutionalism is frequently posited in 
the context of discussions concerning democracy.212  One needs an inde-
pendent rationalization for the adoption of a democratic system.213  During 
the eighteenth century such rationalizations came from natural law theories 
regarding the relationship of free and equal citizens in a rational civil soci-
ety.214  The American founders placed a great deal of stock in this ac-
count.215  The implications of this sort of view could be far reaching, but as 
  
Palgrave MacMillan 2003); L. Ali Khan, A Theory of Universal Democracy: Beyond the End of History 
(Kluwer Publg. 2003); Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra n. 28; Hardin, supra n. 180. 
 206. Hardin, supra n. 180; see also Constitutionalism and Democracy: Studies in Rationality and 
Social Change (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., Cambridge U. Press 1988); Constitutionalism and 
Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World, supra n. 43. 
 207. Wormuth, supra n. 4, at 9. 
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 209. Hardin, supra n. 180, at 152-56. 
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 211. Id.; see also Key Concepts in Critical Theory: Democracy (Philip Green ed., Humanities Press 
1993). 
 212. See Dworkin, supra n. 53. 
 213. Habermas, supra n. 28. 
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Barker trans., Cambridge U. Press 1934). 
 215. James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 90 (Ohio U. Press 1987). 
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with the other elements of constitutionalism the effect was truncated by the 
restrictive and limited notions that were built into the idea as it was em-
ployed in practice.  Democracy is an ideal, but from an institutional point 
of view there have to be ways of employing it.216  The natural law notion 
that “the people” are supreme is conflated and reduced to an institution (or 
set of institutions) through which the will of the people (to use the eight-
eenth century terminology) can be yoked and determined.  These institu-
tions create the appearance of control by the people, but frequently insulate 
the structures of state from actual democratic control.  Democratic institu-
tions, then, were built into the apparatus of modern constitutionalism.   
The right to vote and have a say in the affairs of state were seen to be 
granted by the charter between state and citizen.217  The natural law rheto-
ric provided a justification, but in practice democracy was in effect an ele-
ment of constitutionalism.  As I just hinted, democratic institutions were 
nothing more than positivist structures that allowed for the determination 
of popular sentiment. Such determinations were never seen to be control-
ling, however.  They were always seen (and this is true even today) as in-
formational rather than formational.  This is clearly illustrated by the 
checks on democracy that the American founders built into the American 
constitutional system.218  The American founders were, by and large, dis-
trustful of “the masses.”219  Democracy, in the sense of radical democratic 
participation and will formation, was seen as destructive and troublesome.  
But if democratic participation is seen as a structured institution that can 
effect—yet not control—the state apparatus, it can be subsumed under the 
positivist, formalist and institutionalized system of constitutionalism.  Seen 
in this way, democracy is a corollary of constitutionalism.220  Democracy is 
a device designed to invest people in the institutions of constitutional-
ism.221  Ronald Dworkin has recently endorsed this position, claiming that 
“constitutionalism is essential to creating a democratic community – to 
constituting ‘the people’ – and there can be no communal, collective free-
dom without it.”222  Democracy, in this view, is dependent on constitution-
alism. 
There is another version of the relationship between constitutionalism 
and democracy, however.  This alternative view, espoused by—among 
  
 216. Hardin, supra n. 180, at ch. 7. 
 217. Id. at 157-59. 
 218. See George P. Fletcher, The Separation of Powers: A Critique of Some Utilitarian Justifications, 
in Constitutionalism: Nomos XX, supra n. 3. 
 219. Hardin, supra n. 180, at 123, 144. 
 220. Lane, supra n. 1, at ch. 11. 
 221. Dworkin, supra n. 53, at 10. 
 222. Id. 
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others—the political scientist Robert Dahl,223 maintains that democracy 
and constitutionalism are contradictory concepts.224  The basic argument is 
that constitutionalism limits and constrains the actions of individuals in the 
state (as I have maintained throughout).225  These constraints are not just 
upon the state actors in government positions.  All members of society are 
constrained by the terms of the constitutionalist organs.  For instance, indi-
viduals are constrained from infringing upon one another’s rights.  Democ-
racy, on the other hand, is majoritarian in principle.  One commentator has 
said that “[t]he positive ideals of democracy, popular participation, the rule 
of public opinion, and the glorification of the common man all run up hard 
against modern commitments to rationalism, efficiency, and the distrust of 
mere opinion.”226  Dworkin explains it this way, “a strong objection has 
been pressed against constitutionalism: that it subverts or compromises 
democracy, because if a constitution forbids the legislation to pass a law 
limiting freedom of speech, for example, that diminishes the democratic 
right of the majority to have the law it wants.”227  In this view, which 
Dworkin ultimately rejects,228 constitutionalism and democracy cannot 
both be taken as fundamental and absolute.  One must predominate; we can 
see from the quote just above which Dworkin prefers.229 
There have been attempts to reconcile this perceived conflict between 
constitutionalism and democracy, most notably by Jürgen Habermas.230  
Habermas views democracy and constitutionalism as being what he calls 
“co-original.”  By this he means that democracy and constitutionalism are 
both fundamental, each necessary for the other to work properly but neither 
deriving from the other.231  There is a reciprocal relationship between de-
mocracy and constitutionalism in this account.  Democracy depends on a 
robust notion of constitutionalism (note I have not said modern constitu-
tionalism) and this robust notion of constitutionalism depends on a radical 
democratic project.232  As Habermas puts it, “[t]he interdependence of con-
stitutionalism and democracy comes to light in this complementary rela-
  
 223. See e.g. Dahl, supra n. 52; see also Lane, supra n. 1, at 243-44. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Dworkin, supra n. 53, at 10. 
 226. Yack, supra n. 6, at 107-08. 
 227. Dworkin, supra n. 53, at 2. 
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 230. Jürgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union or Contradictory Princi-
ples? 29 Political Theory 766 (William Rehg trans., 2001). 
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 232. See e.g. Chantel Mouffe, Radical Democracy or Liberal Democracy? 20 Socialist Rev. 57 
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tionship between private and civic autonomy: each side is fed by resources 
it has from the other.”233   
I need not delve too deeply into Habermas’ formulations of private and 
civic autonomy to point out that his project, which includes this reunifica-
tion of democracy and constitutionalism, is a radical departure from the 
traditional modernist conceptions of both constitutionalism and democ-
racy.234  He is talking about a form of communicative democratic theory 
that beefs up the merely formal and positivist legal structures in contempo-
rary societies far beyond anything we have thus far seen historically, and 
probably far beyond what most people can even conceptualize.235  Others 
have discussed and constructed similar radical projects.236  The problem is 
that no such radical democratic theories have taken hold.  Habermas’ logic, 
in this particular interest, necessitates a historical element that can be 
traced to the method of G.W.F. Hegel.  His reliance on this Hegelian237 
device makes his account attractive for my purposes, but has been criti-
cized for mistaking normative constitutionalist practice with a robust no-
tion of moral justification for a particular political worldview.238  As a re-
sult, Habermas’s view would necessitate a much more complex conceptu-
alization of the relationship between citizen and society than is currently in 
fashion. 
Let me return then to the first relationship that I set out in this section, 
the account that articulates the relationship between constitutionalism and 
democracy in derivative terms; the account proffered by Dworkin above.  
This is the version that modern constitutionalism relies on.  In order for the 
constitutionalist state to assume its proper place, the terms of democratic 
action cannot be absolute.  Democratic institutions, like rights regimes, 
play an important part in the equation, but only a part.  This is why the 
American founders went to such lengths to curb the power of majorities.239  
Representative democracy is an acknowledgement that constitutionalism is 
prime and the institutions of popular sovereignty must assume a formal and 
narrowly defined character. 
  
 233. Habermas, supra n. 230, at 780. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See e.g. Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the 
Theory of Communicative Action (Barbara Fultner trans., MIT Press 2001). 
 236. See e.g. Unger, supra n. 151. 
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1971). 
 238. See e.g. Alessandro Ferrara, Of Boats and Principles: Reflections on Habermas’s “Constitu-
tional Democracy”, 29 Political Theory 782 (Dec. 2001); Bonnie Honig, Dead Rights, Live Futures: A 
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 239. Hardin, supra n. 180, at 123, 144. 
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This narrow notion of sovereignty is important in the context of the 
present discussion because it illustrates here again the impulse behind the 
theory of modern constitutionalism.  The relationship between the state and 
citizen is a rational one in which the individual has a certain role to play: 
private actor seeking private ends.  The interface between the state and this 
private actor is the representative democratic apparatus.  Through this ap-
paratus, the views of the citizens can be ascertained, but not always (per-
haps very rarely) acknowledged and complied with.  In this version the 
subservient institutions of democracy play a legitimizing role.  If the con-
stitutional structures are rational and individuals in the state have input into 
(certain) decisions, how could the state not be legitimate?  This view is, at 
least, deductively attractive.  Like the other cornerstones of constitutional-
ism, however, I believe this account of democracy is too feeble and ham-
strung to accomplish the goals that many founders hope to accomplish; a 
healthy civil society in a multicultural and pluralist world. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Modern constitutionalism has played an important part in the devel-
opment of our understanding of the political and legal environment.  The 
concepts associated with modern constitutionalism, divided and limited 
government, individual rights regimes (particularly property ownership 
regimes), and representative democracy, moved political and legal struc-
tures from more rudimentary forms to those we recognize as distinctly 
modern.  The nation-state would not be possible without these conceptions.  
The modern impulse has driven political and legal theorists to delineate the 
structures of state in distinctly rationalist terms, and set these structures 
against what was seen to be retrograde forms of political organization.  
William Connolly describes this well when he says: 
[M]odernity is the epoch in which the destruction of the world fol-
lowed the collective attempt to master it. . . . Even if modernity is 
not unique (it is too early to tell), it is at least distinctive.  In its op-
timistic moments it defines itself by contrast to earlier periods 
which are darker, more superstitious, less free, less rational, less 
productive, less civilized, less comfortable, less democratic, less 
tolerant, less respectful of the individual, less scientific and less 
developed technically than it is at its best.240 
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The impulse behind modern constitutionalism is to break with the past, 
redefine governmental structures along more rational and more scientific 
lines.  In short, modern constitutionalism is a positivist enterprise.  This 
positive move, with its rationalist motivations, constricted the bounds of 
political and legal discourse.  It totalized the notion of the state and its 
structure.  Modern constitutionalism is anti-pluralist and rests on a founda-
tionalist core.  For Hobbes, Locke, Madison and Jefferson, the move to 
memorialize the structures of government in a constitutional text was a 
move to universalize those structures in a normative way.  The only 
“good” notion of constitution is one that conforms to the narrow concep-
tion discussed above. 
The presumption that such a project is possible is astonishing.  The fact 
that this presumption has been so widely accepted is all the more so.  The 
problematic thing about this “success” is that it hinders and makes static 
the dynamism contained in political communities.  It freezes structures in 
place.  It is explicitly designed to do so.  Roberto Unger puts it best when 
he says: 
The founding liberal myth of a constitutional mechanism and a 
system of rights that tower above the hierarchical and communal 
divisions of society has since become true in an unacknowledged 
and embarrassing sense.  Liberal-democratic politics and the soci-
ety in which it is practiced have indeed become separate: a social 
order that consists largely of groups entrenched in fixed niches 
within the division of labor and occupying stable places in the es-
tablished scheme of social hierarchy coexists with a political prac-
tice that plays up to shifting coalitions of interest formed by groups 
with crisscrossing and unstable membership.241 
The mechanisms of modern constitutionalism fragment and stifle social 
discourse.  They undermine political progress instead of promoting them.  
The machine may “go of itself,” but can never exceed its own limitations.  
Modern constitutionalism confines our social and political possibilities. 
This is particularly troubling today.  The world is becoming increas-
ingly complex.  Societies are not homogeneous.  They are multicultural 
and pluralistic.242  Interests that were not recognized (or more properly 
were subsumed and negated) in the development of modern constitutional-
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ist institutions are becoming manifest.243  The demands of oppressed mi-
norities and groups without a voice in traditional political discourses are 
suing for recognition and accommodation.244  Many presume that the terms 
of modern constitutionalism can provide an outlet for such calls.  I am 
convinced, however, that the confines of modern constitutionalism make 
that possibility unlikely at best.245   
There is a track record on this.  Constitutionalist governments are 
prone to fail.  Constitutions based on western liberalism are no excep-
tion.246  There are plenty of examples of modern constitutionalist concepts 
imploding in practice, and how the rationalism and positivity of liberal 
conceptions of law and society can affect terrible results.  Because of this 
dismal track-record, there has been a call, in contemporary discussions of 
constitutionalism, for an expansion of the horizons concerning the way 
polities can be formed and structured.  People like James Tully247 and 
Stanley Katz248 have called for more pluralistic conceptions of constitu-
tionalism.  These calls have not yet come to dominate the debate (as I hope 
they may well do some day), and it is not exactly clear what alternative 
notions of constitutionalism might look like.  Nonetheless, it is clear that 
we need to escape the confines of modern constitutionalism so that a nar-
row, formalist conception of state organization that fosters the spread of 
McDonald’s franchises and Nike shoes more than sound social organiza-
tion can be escaped by cultures and societies that value principles other 
than the cult of consumerism. 
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